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Mind Reader and Maestro:
Models for Understanding Biblical Interpreters
PATRICK R. KEIFERT
Luther-Northwestern Theological Seminaries, St. Paul, Minnesota
The task and results of biblical interpretation will vary greatly, depending upon the
interpreter’s own self-understanding and, at the same time, the interpreter’s estimate of the
character of the text to be interpreted. When we say, “the Bible is Christian Scripture,” we claim
at least that “it ought so to be used in the common life of the church as to nurture and preserve
her self-identity.”1 It follows, then, that if the interpreter understands the text as Scripture,2 then
the interpreter’s self-understanding of the interpretive task is grounded in the common life of the
church, in the church’s nurture and preservation of its self-identity.
Certain models of the interpreter’s self-understanding within the interpretive task might
be found more in keeping than others with the common life of the church, its nurture and
preservation. I will explore several models of the interpreter’s self-understanding of the
interpretive task, pair them with the corresponding understanding of the text and evaluate their
usefulness for interpreting
1

David H. Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975) 150. The
interpretation of any text involves the text in relationship to itself, other texts, the author and its readers. The
arrangement of these four factors in relationship with one another creates the spectrum of possible theories of
interpretation. This essay explores only two of those possible arrangements: the one primarily normed by authorial
intention and the other focusing on the contemporary readers or audience. In neither case are the other factors in the
interpretation of the text ignored. The matter is one of degrees and emphases.
It is clearly possible to interpret the texts of the Bible without understanding them as Christian Scripture.
They may be studied as literature or as a historical source by methods of inquiry unrelated to their status as
Scripture. Here, I follow David Kelsey’s discussion on Scripture, pp. 89-112.
2
This essay is an exercise in systematic theology, not fundamental theology. My concern here is to examine
possible models for the self-understanding of the churchly interpreter of the Bible. Therefore, no argument will be
made as to the possibility of the truth of Scripture to any audience outside the church. Rather, I will be concerned to
examine how Scripture functions for the Christian community. I do not intend this bracketing to imply that such an
argument concerning the truth of Scripture cannot or should not be made. Indeed, I am convinced both that such an
argument is necessary and possible; it simply lies outside the central concerns of this essay. Likewise, the doctrine
of inspiration is not denied; however, it is not directly within the concerns of this essay.
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the Bible as Christian Scripture.3 Models that consciously begin with contemporary readers and
audiences, I will argue, have significant advantages over those that primarily ground meaning in
the consciousness of the author. Or, to put it another way, those models that seek first to bridge
the gap between the life and practice of the contemporary audience and interpretive theory are
relatively more adequate compared to those that primarily seek to bridge the historical gap

between what the text meant and what it means today.
HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC PARADIGMS
Two basic paradigms for the Biblical interpreter and text hold the field today: historical
and linguistic.4 The interpreter might understand his or her role primarily as that of historian and
think of the Biblical text to some degree, as an historical document.5 Such an interpreter would
use the text to authorize claims either in reference to the events behind the text or to the “mind”
of the community of the faithful who are witnesses to those events. In either instance the
interpreter’s task is essentially historical. The appropriate primary claims resulting from such an
interpretation will tend to be historical as well.
Another interpreter might also understand the task from the side of the contemporary
reader or audience and thereby downplay the historian’s task, though not necessarily exclude it.
In this self-understanding the text is essentially under3

By the term “model” I am referring to the use of “an image employed reflectively and critically to deepen
one’s theoretical understanding of a reality.” Avery Dulles, Models of the Church (Garden City: Doubleday, 1978)
19-37. Some models are readily imagined, for example, my Maestro and Player-Coach models, while others are
more abstract, such as Deliberator and church as Sacrament of Dialog. The term “model” has for some time been in
use in the physical and social sciences. I. T. Ramsey, among others, has shown its fruitfulness for theology. I. T.
Ramsey, Religious Language (New York: Macmillan, 1963); Models and Mystery (New York: Oxford University,
1964); Max Black, Models and Metaphors (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1962). In their use in theology, however,
models renew the attempt to relate language and the ultimate mystery of reality. In this attempt, one must recognize
that “religious experience has a depth that has no correlation in our experience of the physical universe...” (Dulles,
p. 30).
I will be using models both to explain and synthesize what I believe is generally held by churchly
interpreters of the Bible and to explore possible new insights into the interpretive enterprise. The Mind Reader
model will be of the former type, and the other models of the latter. The exploratory and heuristic models in no way
suggest that I have rejected the “abiding objective norm in the past, that is, in the revelation that was given once and
for all in Jesus Christ” (Dulles, p. 32). I am using these heuristic models to order our abiding experience of that
revelation.
4
This truism can be seen by the arrangement of the various program categories of the 1980 Centennial
Meeting of the Society for Biblical Literature. The call for papers was divided between approaches to the Bible
through either historical or linguistic paradigms; cf. Scholars Press Scholia X, ed. Char Matejovsky (Missoula:
Scholars, 1980) 5ff.
In this essay I shall mean by the term “paradigm” a model of interpretation that has received general
acceptance and encompasses various models and types within it. Thus, the historical paradigm can include more
than one type of interpretive method, for example, source, form, redaction or sociological criticism. The linguistic
paradigm includes both traditional literary types of interpretation and structuralist and deconstructionist criticism.
5
By speaking of the Bible as historical document, I in no way wish to ignore the many other literary forms
besides historical narrative within the text.
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stood as literary text which is not to say that it is exclusively fictional.6 As in the earlier
understanding of the text as history and the interpreter as historian, there are within this selfunderstanding two broadly construed choices. Either the text’s authority lies primarily in its
effect within the contemporary audience, or it has its authoritative status within its own structure.
There are, then, at least four possible basic types for the interpreter’s self-understanding
and, broadly construed, four possible theories of the text. They need not be mutually exclusive;
they can be integrated in various ways. Such an integration, however, first requires some clarity

on their essential characteristics and functions. Before I attempt such an integration, I shall
briefly describe these four types from the side of models for the interpreter’s self-understanding
of the interpretive task. The first two, historical types, and the fourth, a linguistic type, will be
given short and, by implication, secondary consideration; the third (also linguistic) will be given
a more extensive and developed consideration.
Historical Paradigm: Two Types7
The interpreter can understand the interpretive task as an attempt to discern what actually
took place in the history to which the text refers. For example, when Vincent Taylor interpreted
Mark, he was concerned to underline its value or use as history.8 Taylor was by no means
uninterested in the gospel’s literary style and formal characteristics; he was, however, concerned
to subordinate such observations in service of his goal to establish the outline of Jesus’ ministry.9
The motives of the author (whom Taylor identified as John Mark, a follower of Peter) were taken
into account and carefully subtracted from the text in order to discern the events behind the text.
Apologetic aims, liturgical interests, and doctrinal motives were taken into account in order to
ascertain what Jesus actually said and did.10 In spite of textual redaction, Taylor could, in his role
as historian, confidently speak of the “objectivity of the gospel.”11 For Taylor, Mark could
authorize claims regarding the life and ministry of Jesus that could in turn be normative for
6

I choose to avoid a fast terminological distinction between fiction and history. To a great extent I am in
sympathy with Barbara Herrnstein Smith, On the Margins of Discourse: The Relation of Literature to Language
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978), especially pp. 45ff. She rejects the overt distinctions and categories of
poetry versus history in recognition of the “covert” categories, that is, “categories implicitly acknowledged and
respected in the culture, and learned by its members, but cutting through and across the explicit distinction
presumably reflected in traditional terms such as poetry, prose, literature, fiction, and non-fiction.” As I will say
below, I wish to distinguish between historical and literary criticism, but not propose the great divide imagined by
interpreters who hold one paradigm over the other.
7
By the term “type” I am referring to particular developments of either the linguistic or the historical
paradigm that might be methodological types, but still within the same general paradigm. Thus source criticism is
clearly within the historical paradigm as is redaction criticism, but each orders the historical enterprise quite
differently.
8
Vincent Taylor, The Gospel According to St. Mark: The Greek Text with Introduction, Notes, and Indexes
(2nd Edition; London: MacMillan, 1966) 130-149; hereafter, Commentary.
9
Vincent Taylor, “The Original Order of Q,” New Testament Essays (London: Epworth, 1970) 95-118.
10
Commentary, 131-135.
11
Ibid.,135.
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the life and ministry of the contemporary Church; though the delineation of such norms was
beyond the scope of Taylor’s endeavor.
A second, and perhaps more subtle, type of the first paradigm (the interpreter of Scripture
as historian) focuses on a particular historical event: the mind or consciousness of the author and
the original audience. In this second type of the interpreter as historian, the goal of the
interpretive task focuses on repeating the intention of the author in relationship to the original
audience. For example, Willi Marxsen, in his interpretation of Mark, consciously speaks of the
interpreters task as “repeating (nachsprechen) what the author had meant to say to the original
audience.”12 Marxsen can clearly distinguish between what he calls “exegesis” and “history,”

insofar as history would be viewed as an attempt to go behind the text to establish what really
happened in the life of Jesus. For Marxsen the exegesis of Mark excludes “from the outset...what
really happened” as the subject matter for its investigation.13 In this way he makes clear his
polemic against the form critical school which had sought to isolate the earliest reliable synoptic
material as the basis for a reconstruction of the historical Jesus.
Interpreter as Mind Reader
To a great extent this second type of the historical paradigm for understanding the
interpreter and the character of the text dominates the use of the Biblical text in major portions of
the Church today.14 We clearly distinguish between what the text meant and what it means.15 The
norm, of course, is what it meant. We say to ourselves, “How would the original author have
meant this expression?” Or, “What did the original author and audience have in their minds when
they wrote and heard this text?” The interpreter, then, must “psych-out” the original author and
audience. The authority of the text depends upon the possible analogies between the minds then
and now. Interpretations within this type receive titles like
12
Willi Marxsen, The Beginnings of Christology: A Study in Its Problems (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969) 3;
Mark the Evangelist: Studies on the Redaction History of the Gospel (Nashville: Abingdon, 1969); New Testament
Introduction: An Approach to its Problems (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1968) 134-145.
13
Marxsen, The Beginnings of Christology, 3ff.
14
Norman Perrin wrote: “We need to be able to understand the language in which a text is written, the
nature of the text itself as a historical and literary artifact, the circumstances in which and for which it was written.
We need, further, to understand as far as we can the intent of the author in writing the text and the meaning
understood by those for whom the text was written.” Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom: Symbol and
Metaphor in New Testament Interpretation (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976) 4.
15
Raymond Brown states this general principle when he writes that “to determine the sense of a written
work is largely to determine what its author meant when he wrote it” and that “the principal task of interpretation
centers around the author’s intended meaning,” Jerome Biblical Commentary, II, 606, art. 5. In his last major
publication before his death in November, 1976, Norman Perrin wrote: “Biblical scholars tend to be primarily
historical scholars, so much so that ‘Biblical criticism’ almost always means ‘historical criticism of biblical texts.’”
Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom, 5. Nor is fascination with and acceptance of this historical approach
restricted to the professional experts. Indeed, as Edward Krentz (writing in 1975) points out, the historical-critical
method of biblical exegesis is generally accepted as a valid, indeed as a necessary approach to the biblical writings,
not only in scholarly circles but also at the level of official pronouncements of various Christian churches. Edward
Krentz, The Historical-Critical Method (London: SPCK, 1975) 2-3.
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The Mind of Mark16 and Community of the New Age;17 the former emphasizes the authorial side
of this interpretive type and the latter the audience side. This search into the consciousness of the
original author or community might well be called the Mind Reader model.
The churchly interpreter who would use the Mind Reader model should note possible
pitfalls. Quite often this model ignores the various senses in which the word “author” can be
used. The expression “author” can refer to several different personae. First, it can refer to a
biographical flesh and blood person. For example, Paul of Tarsus would count as the
biographical author. Within this biographical “author” would be the peculiar personal
idiosyncracies that might be hinted at in Galatians and in the First and Second Corinthians,18 but
are unavailable to anyone but his closest intimates. Second, there is the career author. In the case
of Paul one can discern a career author by tracing the supposed development of Paul, the career

author, from First Thessalonians through Romans.19 Third, there is the public figure which in the
case of Paul can best be characterized by his portrayal in Acts and, subsequently, in the Church’s
development of his public character to this day.20 Finally, there is the implied author, the persona
that the reader creates in his/her mind and projects into the text in order to follow the narrative.
Without further detail, I hope that the outline of a spectrum of possible meanings and
theories of author can be discerned from these four possible meanings for the expression
“author.”21 Each might be the appropriate meaning of “author” in the expression “author’s
intention,” depending upon the situation in which the expression is used and the text with which
it is used as an interpretive device. For example, in the case of Mark, the “author’s intention” has
a very lim16

Quentin Quesnell, The Mind of Mark: Interpretation and Method through the Exegesis of Mark 6:52
(Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1969). The search for the author’s intention springs from the Romantic
hermeneutical tradition of Schleiermacher and Dilthey and its insistence on the fact that genuine understanding of a
text involves and aims at “a ‘congenial’ coincidence with the ‘genius’ of the author.” Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation
Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University, 1976) 92. Thus, for
example, Benjamin Jowett, an important 19th century English New Testament scholar and contributor to the
programmatic Essays and Reviews published in 1860 is quoted as having declared that “the true use of interpretation
is to get rid of interpretation and leave us alone in company with the author.” E. C. Blackmann, Biblical
Interpretation: The Old Difficulties and the New Opportunity (London: Independent, 1957) 206.
17
Howard Clark Kee, Community of the New Age: Studies in Mark’s Gospel (Philadelphia Westminister,
1977). Note especially the praise of E. D. Hirsch, Jr. for his defense of the author in Validity in Interpretation (New
Haven: Yale, 1967) where Kee discusses Hirsch’s contribution to the hermeneutical discussion, p. 1 of Kee.
Recent surveys of Markan interpretation bear this observation out: H. Conzelmann, “Literaturbericht zu
den Synoptischen Evangelien,” Theologische Rundschau 37 (1972) 220-272; H. C. Kee, “Mark’s Gospel in Recent
Research,” Interpretation 34 (1978) 353-368; J. Kingsbury, “The Gospel of Mark in Current Research” Religious
Studies Review 5 (1979) 101-107; T. A. N. Vo, “Interpretation of Mark’s Gospel in the Last Two Decades,” Studia
Biblica et Theologica 2 (1972) 37-72; R. Pesch, Das Markusevangelium (HTKNT: 2 vols. Freiburg/ Basel 1/Wein:
Herder, 1976-77) contains exhaustive bibliographies.
18
Robert Jewett, A Chronology of Paul’s Life (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), 29f.
19
Ibid., 1-24, 63-92.
20
Ibid.
21
Wayne C. Booth, Critical Understanding: The Power and Limits of Pluralism (Chicago: University of
Chicago, 1979), 268.
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ited use. We do not have enough data to say much about the biographical or career “author” and
not much more to say about the public author. We are left more often than not with the implied
author of Mark, that persona the interpreter creates to bring a consistent meaning to the entire
text.22
And yet it is insufficient, though necessary, to chasten this model with these various
references for the word “author.” Quite often the Mind Reader model ignores the great
complications in deciphering another human consciousness.23 Fishing expeditions in the territory
of another person’s consciousness, even one who is present with you in conversation, are tricky
at best. How much more difficult must it be to attempt the same feat with a person dead two
thousand years! With a contemporary person we have at the minimum the numerous nonverbal
signals of body language and pre-linguistic background that we share. In some cases this may
follow a relatively long period of familiarity with this person. The experienced interpreter of

human nature would be reticent to claim to understand, without considerable reservations, the
mind of any person who might out of the blue speak to him or her. Though the Bible may not
speak out of the blue, it is for us devoid of many contextual pre-understandings that a
conversation implies. In the case of Mark, for example, where we have primarily the implied
author, little or none of the complex contextual material is present that would make reading Mark
roughly analogous to a conversation or even a letter from a contemporary.
I hope that even with these short observations, the impasses that confront the Mind
Reader model are evident. This is not to say it does not have a place among appropriate means of
interpreting the Biblical text. I hope to leave with you, however, the significant reservations and
limitations involved in such a model. It should be clear that such a model would be insufficient
for the churchly interpreter, and certainly an extremely limited manner in which to have the Bible
be Scripture for the Church. If the Bible is to be used “in the common life of the church as to
nurture and preserve her self-identity,” then other models would have to supplement and perhaps
encompass it.
The Linguistic Paradigm: Two Types
Other models are available as a result of contemporary hermeneutical discussions. The
hermeneutical principle of authorial intention, which provides the major hermeneutical
grounding for the historical-critical method in Biblical exegesis, has been brought into question
by opposing theories.24 L. Griffin, for ex22

Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University, 1978) 18.
23
No more sophisticated and thoughtful “defense of the author” exists than in Eric Donald Hirsch, Jr.,
Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University, 1967) and The Aims of Interpretation (Chicago: University
of Chicago, 1976). He attempts to avoid both pitfalls to which I refer in this essay, but in the end, I believe,
succumbs to both. For an excellent analysis of Hirsch’s failure on this score see David Couzens Hoy, The Critical
Circle: Literature and History in Contemporary Hermeneutics (Berkeley: University of California, 1978) 11-35.
24
While it is clear that historical-critical Biblical exegesis makes use of a wide variety of methods and
approaches, I shall in this essay use the terms “historical-critical method” and “historical-critical exegesis” to refer
globally to these various methods insofar as they are governed by the principle of authorial intention and are thus
(ultimately) directed toward discovering the author’s intention or intended meaning as understood by the original
readers or addressees in the historical situation in which the writing arose.
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ample, writes of a “new tendency” which questions “the adequacy of the author’s intention as an
explanation of his product” and claims “that the author’s intention is only a partial explanation,
and that in fact any real explanation must be had through insistence on the work itself which in
fact may exceed the author’s intention or indeed may fall short of it.”25 In Anglo-American
literary-critical circles,26 the principle of authorial intention has for some time been the subject of
lively debate, and indeed this principle has been dubbed by Wimsatt and Beardslay the
“Intentional Fallacy.”27 As Amos Wilder puts it:
In literary criticism attention has now for some time been directed to the given
work as a self-sufficient aesthetic whole which should be allowed to make its own
impact apart from extraneous considerations having to do with the author and his

circumstances or intentions....28
As I stated above, there are two broadly construed choices within the linguistic paradigm.
The one would focus on the “world” created by the text in its effect on the contemporary reader.
Likewise, this choice would take note of the complex relationship the reader establishes with the
text. Of this choice I will later have much to say. The second alternative within the linguistic
paradigm is the structuralist approach to texts,29 which is in many ways the antithesis of the
historical paradigm. If the historical approach provides the tools for uncovering and analyzing the
author’s intended meaning, structuralism aims at uncovering and analyzing the deep structures of
the text itself, which are quite independent of what the author mayor may not have intended.30
For the structuralist approach, to use Paul Ricoeur’s words, a text is “an absolute object for and
in itself.”31 Therefore, the text’s meaning is a function of the interrelations among its elements.
Authorial intention is thus considered irrelevant so far as the meaning of the text is concerned.
Though considerable and fruitful discussion has been dedicated to the use of structural analysis
of the Biblical text, models dependent on
25
L. Griffin, “Hermeneutics,” Irish Theological Quarterly, 37 (1970) 237-38. Of this “new tendency”
Griffin writes that it “does have the good effect of taking biblical hermeneutics out of its isolation and inserting it
into the larger field of general interpretation...” 242.
26
I refer here not to what is commonly known as “literary criticism” among biblical scholars but to what R.
W. Funk calls “literary literary criticism;” cf. “Foreword” to Semeia 8 (1977) vii. Throughout this essay, the term
“literary criticism” shall be used in this sense.
27
See G. Hermeren, “Intention and Interpretation in Literary Criticism,” New Literary History 7 (1975-76)
57-82, especially p. 57; W. K. Wimsatt, The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry (Lexington: University
of Kentucky, 1967), especially the essay written in collaboration with M.C. Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,”
pp. 3-18.
28
Amos Niven Wilder, Early Christian Rhetoric: The Language of the Gospel (Cambridge: Harvard
University, 1972) xxv.
29
For a good introduction to the structuralist approach to texts see R. Scholes, Structuralism in Literature:
An Introduction (New Haven: Yale University, 1974). See also R. Barthes, “Introduction à l’analyse structurale des
récits,” Communications 8 (1966) 1-27.
30
Robert Everard C. Johnston, Text and Text-Interpretation in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur (unpublished
licentiate dissertation presented to the Higher Institute of Philosophy, Katholieke Universiteit te Leuven, 1977) 2.
Mr. Johnston’s dissertation and a book manuscript (yet unpublished) on Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutical theory have
been of considerable help in sorting out some of the argument of this essay.
31
Paul Ricoeur, “Du conflit à la convergence des méthodes en exégèse biblique,” Exégèse et herméneutique
by R. Barthes et al. (Paris: Ed du Seuil, 1971) 38.
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this type of interpretation will not be my major concern in this essay. I have, instead, chosen to
focus on that choice within this paradigm which concerns itself with the relationship between the
contemporary audience and the world that the text creates.
Recently much discussion of the Bible as Scripture and as authoritative has focused on
models of interpretation that are roughly within this broad type. I will call it the contemporary
audience type. Instead of understanding the Biblical interpreter’s task as negotiating the gap
between what was once said and what might appropriately be said today, what the text meant and
means, much recent thought has turned to negotiating the gap between hermeneutical theory and
pastoral praxis. To one degree or another they have taken seriously Johannes-Baptist Metz’s

observation that “the fundamental hermeneutical problem of theology is not the problem of how
systematic theology stands in relation to historical theology, how dogma stands in relation to
history, but what is the relation between theory and practice.”32
David Kelsey, though in many important ways quite unlike Professor Metz in theological
outlook, suggests that Scripture’s authority is conferred upon it and is in a reciprocal relationship
with audience, or community, that understands it as authoritative.33 Kelsey, I believe, rightly
observes that the church’s influence on the interpreter’s view of Scripture is crucial. Professional
interpreters might make suggestions as to how the text should be understood, but such
suggestions grow out of and respond to the common life of the church both in its liturgical and
moral forms.34 It is then quite sensible to argue, as I have suggested above, that the fundamental
form of the Christian interpretation of Scripture is the life, activity and organization of the
Christian community.
Interpreter as Maestro35
Such interpretation can, I believe, be understood best under the category of performance
of the Biblical text. By analogy this might mean comparing the interpretation of the Biblical text
to a chamber orchestra playing a Mozart symphony. We have a group of people interpreting a
text. It is possible that they are playing the piece incorrectly, or at best, poorly. The score may
include misprints, or the orchestra may simply misunderstand the signs on the score, or the
players may lack the basic technical skills to perform the score. Even if the orchestra is quite
capable technically of performing the score, critics might conclude that it is unfaithful to the
score; the performance lacks a certain truthfulness. Though all of these faults might be present,
the text could be to some degree faithfully enacted.
A model of the interpreter of the Biblical text based on this analogy would not exclude
the important work of the historical critic. The corruption of the score would require careful
textual criticism. The range of possibilities for the particular
32

Johannes-Baptist Metz, “Relationship of Church and World in the Light of Political Theology,” Theology
of Renewal 2. Renewal of Religious Structures, L. K. Shook (New York: 1968) 260.
33
Kelsey, Uses, 150.
34
Ibid., 208ff.
35
I use the term “maestro” in the sense of the master of any art. In this case, the conductor of a chamber
orchestra has clarified the model. This model first came to mind upon hearing a lecture by N. L. A. Lash which, to
my knowledge, has not been published.
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form of symphony, its Sitz im Leben, and the editorial developments of the form in the hand of
the master, would certainly require the work of the form and redaction critic. But these would not
be the focus; nor would the problems raised by them be the primary concern of the performance.
Any model based on this analogy between the performance of a symphony and the performance
of the Biblical text would focus on the performance itself as the crucial context and norm for the
interpretation. This shift of focus, though not rejecting the historical-critical method, places the
conclusions and significance of those conclusions in a completely different order of value. The
interpreter, let us say on a Sunday morning, changes from Mind Reader to Maestro.
I have recently had the opportunity to observe the work of the St. Paul Chamber Orchestra
under the direction of Pinchas Zukerman. Mr. Zukerman’s delightful manner, his expressive care

for the truth of the performance and the fidelity of the music, have helped crystalize my thoughts on
this model. The director of a chamber orchestra is perhaps not quite as crucial as the director of a
symphony orchestra. Nonetheless, the director’s task is primarily to allow the individual members
as an ensemble to create the music. As the principal interpreter of the text, the director leads the
ongoing discussion called interpretation. Each member of the chamber orchestra must and does
have an interpretation of the piece. In the case of the St. Paul Chamber Orchestra many of the
members offer considerable skills and detailed information about the history and form of the text.
The director must identify the interpretation most appropriate, not only for the original performers,
but most especially for the contemporary performers.
Interpreter as Player-Coach36
Perhaps the Maestro model is too elitist. At any rate, it could lead to too great an
emphasis on the virtuoso character of the interpreter. It is, however, true that much of the
necessary and crucial work of interpretation is done alone and then brought to the community for
discussion and enactment. In this case, the Player-Coach model might help clarify the role of the
interpreter in the interpretation of Scripture within the community.
In this model the text is the playbook, often referred to as the Bible of the Game. Any
player caught not only in ignorance of but also unable to execute the playbook—to inwardly
digest it—in the moment of action will suffer rather grave consequences. The character of the
interpretation of the text as a cooperative team play suggests the communal character of the Bible
as Scripture.
Once again to lessen the possibility of an authoritarian model of the interpreter, each
coach, too, must venture onto the field of play. In the heat of the skirmish, each interpreter must
bring about a mutual interpretation that is finally judged by its success on the playing field. This
model recognizes the vulnerability of the interpreter who has not developed the community of
trust and high morale
36

In using the model of Player-Coach I am drawing an analogy with games and the interpretive enterprise.
In doing so I recognize many possible misunderstandings as to the capricious or even skeptical appearance this
might create. Neither should be the case. Considerable discussion of game theory and interpretation theory exists.
For further material read: Wayne C. Booth, Critical Understanding: The Power and Limits of Pluralism, 29-30.
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necessary for the test of the community in the game. Anyone who fails to include the community
in his or her interpretation risks getting sacked.
Two other possible objections might arise out of the Player-Coach model of interpreter.
First, one might object to the analogy between interpreting Scripture and a game. “Interpreting
Scripture is serious business, not a game,” one might object. This is true. On the other hand, one
need only observe the professional athlete before the beginning of the game or in the heat of a
crucial play. Think of the hours of individual and team practice and study, long and tedious
repetitions of exercises, the struggle for excellence in mind, body and spirit. If the average
professional interpreter of Scripture within the community of the Church engaged in such “play”
one might not make such an objection.
A second objection might be to the violent images employed in some instances of this
model: the player-coach may play on a hockey team. Surely no model can be effectively

analogous at all points, nor sufficient for all moments in this argument. However, the
possibilities of violence, especially the possibilities for oppression both within and without the
community of interpreters, must not be forgotten. In fact, the churchly interpreter might well be
quite suspicious of any model of interpreter that ignores the possibility of such systemic
distortion within and without the community.37
Interpreter as Deliberator
In noting the possibility of violence and oppression within the community of
interpretation, Johannes-Baptist Metz’s concern for theory and praxis comes home again. Though
my focus is on the imaginative character of interpretation of the Bible as Scripture, this “does not
make it any less political activity;”38 it truly is a political act. The imaginative and the political
character of interpretation are equally significant and necessary.39 This political character of
interpretation might be developed under the model of the interpreter as Deliberator.
In the face of violence and oppression the community needs to deliberate; at its best, it
acts out its shared hope as a result of a deliberative and persuasive discourse. When the
professional interpreter of the Bible engages in the enactment or performance of the text within
the community, she or he leads such deliberation. The sermon, for example, need not, in its
concern for the truth, be an edict or prescription of the dos and don’ts of the community. It can be
a winsome deliberation upon the truth that the community shares, without lessening the
proclamatory or prophetic character of the interpretation. For the Christian deliberator cannot
escape pronouncing the mercy and judgment of God, nor escape its way
37

The integration of theory and practice in the various discussions of hermeneutics represents important
discussions in political philosophy too broad to do more than hint at their implications. On the specific topic of
systematic distortion within the community of discourse, see Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston:
Beacon, 1975) and his Theory and Practice (Boston: Beacon, 1971).
38
Stanley Hauerwas, “The Moral Authority of Scripture: The Politics and Ethics of Remembering,”
Interpretation 34 (1980) 364.
39
Langdon Gilkey, Reaping the Whirlwind: A Christian Interpretation of History (New York: Seabury,
1976). See especially Gilkey’s discussion of “Politics and Meaning,” pp. 57ff., for the intimate relationship between
the imaginative character of interpretation and political activity and meaning.
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in her life.40 Such pronouncing includes all the members in the community in a same-saying
(homilia), not in angry fiats and coercive sophistries.41 Either the power of the promise that calls
us together and the hope it engenders is sufficient for creating servants of the world, or the
community will ultimately fail.
Under the model of Deliberator the interpreter would not be set afield to force members
of the community to the truth.42 Deliberation dependent upon the proclamation of the promise
that has brought the community of the faithful into existence draws the community into enacting
the text in daily life. Deliberators do not need canned solutions, nor any authority other than their
shared trust in the promise that enables the community. Deliberators persuade; Christian
deliberators give good reasons for the hope we share.43
Interpreter as Storyteller
These good reasons that deliberation discovers can take the shape of a story. Some would

argue that the character of the Biblical text is far closer to story than it is to history.44 Others
would characterize Scripture, along with Hans Frei, as having a “history-like” quality, but they
would also say that the real meaning of the text does not reside in how accurately or inaccurately
it reports historical events.45 Such an understanding of the text of Scripture might mandate the
model of the interpreter as storyteller.
Stanley Hauerwas, in a most insightful essay, integrates his concern for the political and
ethical use of Scripture in the Christian community with the role of
40

These models of interpretation underline the old saw that the preacher cannot escape the message
preached. The interpreter is never external from the interpretation; perhaps alienated from it, but not outside it.
41
As a student pastor I served as assistant to a pastor who would translate his text each Monday morning
and spend the rest of the week working the text over with members of the parish. No hospital visit or administrative
meeting went by without some shared reflection on the text. Those who had been in contact with him during the
week would probably recongize much of Sunday’s sermon as a part of their own interpretation of that text during
that week.
Some might suggest that this model would have us talk the church to death. It is possible, of course, to talk
the church to a standstill. If it is the word of life who calls us into conversation, however, we can also be talked to
life.
42
For a further development of this theme, I would suggest Hans Küng’s short meditation, The Church:
Maintained in Truth (New York: Seabury, 1980), and the discussion of infallibility versus indefectibility in
Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue VI, ed. Paul C. Empie, T. Austin Murphy and Joseph A. Burgess
(Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1978).
I find the introduction to Preaching the Story (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980) by Edmund A. Steimle, Morris
J. Niedenthal, and Charles L. Rice, most instructive, especially in their call for a “holistic view of preaching,” which
includes four factors: “the preacher, the listener, the churchly context including the institutional organization, and
the message. Any really comprehensive view of preaching must do justice to all four factors, without focusing
unduly on any one of them,” p.1f.
43
For a general introduction to how stories might be a form of persuasion in our contemporary situation, see
Wayne C. Booth, Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent (Chicago University of Chicago, 1974, especially pp.
180ff). For a marvelous development of this rhetoric of persuasion in a Christian theologian, see Robert W. Jenson,
Story and Promise: A Brief Theology of the Gospel About Jesus (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1973).
44
James Barr, The Bible in the Modern World (New York: Harper & Row, 1973) 147f. See also James
Barr’s “Story and History in Biblical Theology,” Journal of Religion 46 (1976) 1-17.
45
See Hans Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative (New Haven: Yale University, 1974).
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narrative and imaginative discrimen46 in the interpretation of the Bible as Scripture.47 He speaks
of the moral authority of Scripture under the heading of the “Morality of Remembering: the
Scripture as Narrative.”48 The “narrative of Scripture not only ‘renders a character’49 but renders
a community capable of ordering its existence appropriate to such stories.”50 Thus, Scripture need
not be ordered by a dogmatic canon within a canon, but one can understand the whole of
Scripture as “one long ‘loosely structured non-fiction novel’ that has sub-plots that at some
points appear minor but later turn out to be central.”51 The character of the community that it
creates and requires “must be able to make the narratives of Scripture central for its life.”52 It is a
community that “knows it has a history and tradition which separates it from the world.”53
I would not want to reduce this model to this ethical dimension, nor would I want to
exclude it. It should, however, be encompassed within a broader theology of narrative. Gabriel
Fackre has made just such an attempt to explore the Christian story. He sets out to do a Christian
systematic theology based on and reflected in a “narrative interpretation of basic Christian

doctrine.”54 He understands as his “ultimate source of the Christian Story...the Scriptures of the
Old and New Testament.” The authority of the Bible rests in “its testimony to the decisive events
in the faith narrative.”55 The story is subject to the norm of the Bible; “it must be 1) rooted in the
biblical source and accountable to its storyline norm, 2) continuous with the traditions of the
Church, past and present, 3) intelligible to those to whom it is addressed, connected to the
realities of their time and place, and illuminative of their lived experience.”56
Fackre seeks the “core”57 of the Christian faith under the imaginative discrimen58 of
several “acts in the Christian drama,” which are “the chapters in the Story: Creation, Fall,
Covenant, Christ, Church, Salvation, Consummation, with their Prologue and Epilogue, God.”
This development of the Storyteller model still has several steps to go before completely bridging
the gap between story and audience, but it points in the right direction.59 It is sufficiently exciting
to see the shape of a new relationship between Biblical interpretation and systematic theology in
this development of this model.
46

Kelsey, Uses, 160. Kelsey in turn borrowed the concept from Robert C. Johnson, Authority in Protestant
Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1959) 15.
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Hauerwas, “The Morality of Scripture,” 364.
48
Ibid., 365.
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Kelsey interprets Karl Barth in this manner, Uses, p. 39.
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Hauerwas, “The Morality of Scripture,” 366.
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Ibid.
52
Ibid., 367.
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Ibid; one need not take a sectarian position to affirm this notion.
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Gabriel Fackre, The Christian Story: A Narrative Interpretation of Basic Christian Doctrine (Grand
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1978) 1-2.
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Ibid., 22.
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Ibid., 39.
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Ibid., 14. Fackre follows the suggestion of Martin E. Marty in his The Fire We Can Light: The Role of
Religion in a Suddenly Different World (Garden City: Doubleday, 1973), 219, where he suggests that we core and
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Fackre, The Christian Story, 15.
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The same might be said of Hans Frei’s development of his theoretical work, The Identity of Jesus Christ:
The Hermeneutical Bases of Dogmatic Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975).
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QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIONS
Several questions and objections can and should be raised to the theory of interpretation
that supports these latter models. Every performance or enactment of a musical score or a
dramatic or literary text is a new event in the history of the meaning of the text. Texts, as Paul
Ricoeur notes, have itineraries.60 Or, as Hans-Georg Gadamer puts it, “The discovery of the true
meaning of a text or a work of art is never finished; it is in fact an infinite process.”61 In the case
of great classical texts or scores this is quite clear. But is this apparent relativism not contrary to
the finality of God’s work in Jesus the Christ? Do these models imply a diminution of Christian
claims to truth ? Is it entirely true of the texts of Scripture to suggest that they are merely
“history-like,” or “fictional” narratives? Have we given up on the historical claims of the
Christian texts?
We do ourselves a disservice if we appropriate these models based upon a linguistic
paradigm of text and interpreter without addressing these important theological and historical

truth questions. Though I cannot give any complete argument here, some suggestions follow. It is
possible to perform Mozart, not only badly, but incorrectly. The incomplete character of the
interpretive enterprise does not legitimate all interpretation. To say that historical perception and
enactment of truth is always partial, always provisional, does not lead to the conclusion that we
are simply incapable of acting and speaking truly. Certain ways of enacting, performing,
enlivening the Christian texts are false. Though the cases are seldom clear-cut and often require
centuries of mutual conversation, truth claims regarding interpretation of the Christian Scriptures
remain appropriate.62
Such conversation cannot be judged by some supposed external principle that will
provide a final test.63 Only in a community which I would like to charac60

Paul Ricoeur, “The Bible and the Imagination” (unpublished manuscript presented at The William Rainey
Harper Conference on Biblical Studies, October 3-5, 1979, The Divinity School of The University of Chicago), 2.
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Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury, 1975) 265.
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Several important distinctions should and can be made regarding the character of the truth claims of the
Bible. First, the character of the Biblical text is in most cases practical conversation in which arguments or claims to
truth are basically superfluous. However, in those places within the Bible where certain arguments or thematic
discourse predominates truth claims appear. Secondly, the character of much preaching may not require such
explicit arguments or truth claims, but eventually the professional interpreter of the Bible as Scripture will need to
make argument for its explicit truth claims. For a further discussion of the relationship between truth claims and
practical and thematic discourse see Jürgen Habermas, “Wahrheitstheorien,” Wirklichkeit und Reflexion (Festschrift
für Walter Schulz; Pfullingen: 1973) 211-265.
63
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claim can be justified, that is maintained (cf. Habermas, “Wahrheitstheorien,” 211f). What I am trying to underline
in this essay is that such arguments of justification cannot ignore the question of worth or value in maintaining truth
claims. The participation of the interpreter with the text can have a moment of critical explanation, but must return
to a moment of second naiveté (cf. Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning, 7188, and The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Work, ed. Charles E. Reagan and David Stewart
[Boston: Beacon, 1978] 149-166).
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terize as “a sacrament of dialog,”64 can this conversation take place. In such a sacramental
community the truth of the Christian texts becomes present in the community’s mutual trust and
hope. This is a trust and hope called into existence by the word of promise and manifested in the
sacramental presence of Christ in his Church.65
This model of the Church eschews the constraint of conversation concerning the truth of
the Christian texts as to what has previously been established as what they “originally meant.”
Without denying the place of the text, form, and redaction critics, it is still necessary to seek
appropriation in the present situation. On the other hand, we cannot forsake understanding what
the author meant. Here, however, I prefer Gadamer’s description of this search for authorial
intention as an attempt “to recapture the perspective within which he...formed his views” and
endorse Collingwood’s dictum: “We can understand a text only when we have understood the
question to which it is an answer.”
Nothing within this understanding of truth in relationship to the sacrament of dialog,
which takes place in the church, is incompatible with the finality of the work of Christ. Indeed, it
recognizes and takes account of the radical eschatological character of the message and work of

Christ, the principally promissory character of it.
I am not prepared to suggest that the linguistic paradigm can be sufficient for the
interpretation of Scripture, nor that my concern for relating theory and practice so intimately can
leave behind the historical questions that might be raised. To take the interpretation of Mark as
an example: it is one thing to question Vincent Taylor’s hierarchy of values when he interprets
Mark; it is another to claim that he is quite mistaken in detecting and examining historical
referential claims in the text. Mark does not simply give symbolic expression to certain pervasive
features of the human drama; his Gospel also expresses the author’s confidence in the person
Jesus and the promise which he embodied. Certain historical claims are made that remain subject
to historical examination and are characteristic of the Christian teaching.
I hesitate to make some great divide between literary criticism and historical
interpretation. All too often such differences are exaggerated. Some perceive the literary critics’
judgments to be “merely subjective” in character, lacking any significance as knowledge.66 On
the other hand, so many non-historians suggest that historical methodology is hopelessly
positivistic, a claim I cannot support.67
64
This develops Edward Schillebeeckx, Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God (New York:
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communion and servant with the Church as sacrament and herald.
66
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There is, nonetheless, a difference between literary criticism and historical criticism.
Here I must appeal both to the complexity and perhaps essential mystery of the reality to
which the Christian texts point and the importance of the ongoing conversation of the
community, the sacrament of dialog which is grounded in the Gospel and the promise of the
Spirit.
Advantages
In the meantime, certain advantages accrue from these linguistic models that, by way of
summary, commend them to the professional interpreter of the Bible as Scripture within the
Christian community.
First, though they downplay the historical gap, they are strong in their ability to address
the relationship between the Christian message and Christian living today. Their dependence
upon a close tie between theory and practice avoids the bracketing of preaching, pastoral care and

counseling, and political issues away from direct implication in the interpretive process. They
counteract the opinion of one of my exegetical teachers who said at the conclusion of a strenuous
textual, source, form, and redactional analysis of a text, “The rest is homiletics,” as if to say the
rest is either easy, or worse, less significant.
Second, these models restore the devotional and liturgical uses of Scripture to a fuller
place in the interpretive process both in the understanding of the text and the self-understanding
of the interpreter. In this way, they take more seriously the place of pre-understanding and elevate
its often secondary and solely negative role to a positive source for the interpretation of the text.
Third, these models imply a re-evaluation, but not a rejection, of classical nineteenth
century hermeneutics of suspicion, e.g., historical consciousness.68 These models point beyond
what some have described as “critical description and capricious faith” of much Biblical
interpretation.69 Rather than disparaging
68

In principle I would argue that all of the classical hermeneutics of suspicion could be encompassed within
this argument, if it were to be developed. The work of Freud, Marx, Neitzsche and Feuerbach need not be neglected
or ignored but can be incorporated into and encompassed by the experience of good will and trust engendered by the
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the accomplishments of historical critics, my intention has been to bring as much discipline to the
side of appropriation and enactment of the texts as has been the case in the historical analysis of
the texts. The work of the historian need not be neglected but can be incorporated critically and
encompassed by a more complete understanding of the interpretive enterprise.
Fourth, the focus on performance and enactment leads the Christian community to action.
The model of the Church as Servant to the world can find a much more conducive environment
within these models of the interpreter’s self-understanding of the interpretive task than in the
Mind Reader model. Moreover, they can perhaps be a step on the road to the oft spoken, but
seldom manifested, theology of the laity both within and without the doors of the local
congregation.

